Washington Lawyer - May/June 2024 - 11

FEATURE
" With any sort of major incident, MPD would stand up what's called our
Joint Operations Command Center, or JOCC, " Haiman says. The cameras
transmit encrypted analog images over a secure, wireless network into
JOCC, which then converts them into digital images and projects them
onto monitors. In 2006 the District began installing permanent MPD
CCTV cameras in neighborhoods after authorization by D.C. Council and
the mayor. Still, the images were " passively " monitored - simply captured
and recorded, available to police when solving crimes.
Later the city established the Command Information Center (CIC), responsible
for directing the placement of temporary cameras and monitoring
live feeds. When activated, JOCC would work in conjunction with
CIC to collect information and distribute resources. In February, JOCC
and CIC merged to create the Real-Time Crime Center.
" Nothing about the Real-Time Crime Center, in and of itself, changes
what law enforcement officers have access to today, " Haiman says. " MPD
consistently considers civil liberties and concerns about surveillance and
privacy. "
It is not the goal of the city to turn the crime center into a surveillance
entity, Haiman assures. " I know that's always the concern when people
hear about something like this ... but that's movie stuff. "
In crimes like carjackings where the perpetrator crosses into another jurisdiction,
Haiman says " the system can allow coordination to make sure
that we respond to the victims of the crime and hopefully hold someone
accountable. " Cameras can also make police interactions more targeted
and information-based, reducing the number of unnecessary interactions
with law-abiding residents, according to Haiman.
As for the potential misuse of information by internal or external actors,
Haiman says that this is a perennial concern in law enforcement. " Everyone
who works at the center goes through robust training, " Haiman
adds, pointing out that MPD's internal affairs and audit compliance divisions
already investigate the potential for misuse of data and proactively
seek out unusual patterns to uncover it. " We're the first to raise those
kinds of concerns, " says Haiman, noting that officers face serious consequences
for abusing their access privileges.
VAGUE LINES OF AUTHORITY
The American Civil Liberties Union of the District of Columbia (ACLUD.C.)
has a different perspective on video monitoring in the District and
elsewhere.
" To go back a little bit and remember where these joint operation centers
come from, they are known across the country as fusion centers.
These are post-9/11 data operations to encourage coordination and
collaboration between agencies, and there are similarities in how they
operate, " says ACLU-D.C. Executive Director Monica Hopkins.
Hopkins says that many Patriot Act provisions, which expanded law
enforcement's surveillance abilities, have expired as anxiety over the
attacks faded and the public had opportunity to consider the impacts
on their civil rights and privacy. However, established laws and programs
are more difficult to modify or uproot and can result in long-term consequences
for the individuals and communities impacted, she says.
" The argument that this is necessary due to the crime rate is about tapping
into our fears, " Hopkins says. Paraphrasing Ben Franklin's words, she
adds, " We should not give up our civil liberties for a little bit of security. "
Interagency intelligence-sharing programs like the Real-Time Crime
Center are inherently problematic, Hopkins says. " These operations have
vague lines of authority, which is really important when you have multiple
jurisdictions in play working under very different laws and operating
procedures, " she says. " This allows the participants to policy shop, deciding
which law enforcement agency is best able to achieve the outcome
the government wants without any public hearings, oversight, or accountability. "
BUT
WHO'S ACCOUNTABLE?
A January 2024 report by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights and Urban Affairs (WLC) following its investigation into MPD's
Gang Tracking and Analysis System, the so-called " D.C. Gang Database, "
highlights some of the problems that arise when information is shared
with multiple agencies but inaccessible to the public.
The WLC report found that at least 22 outside entities received information
from MPD that could result in serious repercussions such as loss of
employment or housing, expulsion or suspension from school, and immigration
consequences, and that many individuals on the list did experience
those outcomes. At the same time, " MPD does not inform individuals
of their inclusion [in] ... the database; does not have processes for
individuals to contest or appeal gang affiliation; [and] does not have processes
to regularly review or purge faulty designations, " the report stated.
The Real-Time Crime Center brings together nine law enforcement agencies
- Amtrak Police, Arlington County Police, U.S. Capitol Police, Fairfax
County Police, Metro Transit Police, Montgomery Police, U.S. Park Police,
Prince George's County Police, and the U.S. Secret Service Uniform
Division - to monitor and respond to criminal activities in real time.
"
The argument that
this is necessary due
to the crime rate is
about tapping into
our fears.
MONICA HOPKINS
ACLU-D.C.
" Regardless of MPD's policies, the entities with which it shares data are
frequently even less transparent, and their use and retention of the information
is less regulated, " says Carlos Andino, assistant U.S. attorney at the
Department of Justice's new Affirmative Civil Rights and Environmental
Justice Unit. (At the time of this interview, Andino was associate counsel
for WLC.)
Interagency cooperation also undermines an individual's access to information
that could be of assistance to their defense against criminal
MAY/JUNE 2024 * WASHINGTON LAWYER 11
ACLU-D.C.
Washington Lawyer - May/June 2024

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